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Abstract
Infrastructure operation can be described as separate util-
ity systems provisioning unconstrained demand, with higher 
throughput corresponding to higher profits. In contrast, an 
efficiency perspective would prioritize coordinated infra-
structure operation focused on essential service delivery at the 
lowest possible resource use. We investigate how to accelerate 
the adoption of alternative infrastructure operation configura-
tions which are: centred on the end-user and their demand for 
services; concerned with implementing resource efficiency im-
provements; and consider multiple infrastructure streams. We 
call these alternative modes of operation Multi-Utility Service 
Companies (MUSCos).
Market and system failures that arise in privatised utility sys-
tems present barriers to the adoption of MUSCos. This paper 
categorises these barriers and investigates the extent to which 
the European Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) overcomes 
them. The EED is analysed because energy is required to deliver 
the majority of household infrastructure services and as a result 
energy policy will have influence over the related infrastructure 
systems.
Our research finds that the EED could increase adoption 
of service-oriented contracts in the public sector, potentially 
resulting in spillover to the domestic and commercial sector. 
However, without changes to accounting practices, financial 
instruments and standardisation of contracts, investment risks 
and transaction costs would remain high and it is unlikely that 
this spillover would occur. In addition, the continued frag-
mentation of policy and cross-sector information asymmetries 
augments existing barriers to more integrated infrastructure 
operation. 
We describe additional measures that might overcome these 
weaknesses; including measures to reduce contractual barri-
ers and risks in the domestic sector, provide more appropriate 
financing and accounting arrangements and more explicitly ad-
dress the interconnectivity of infrastructure systems in future 
policy.
Introduction
Our physical infrastructure – the system of energy, transport, 
digital information, water, waste and flood protection assets – 
is a means to an end; it is built, maintained and expanded in 
order to enable the functioning of society and the economy. In 
turn, however, the technical building blocks of infrastructure 
and its geographic layout determine, to quite a large extent, the 
level and composition of a society’s resource demand, creating 
lock-in to certain types of resource dependency and uses (Un-
ruh, 2000). Perhaps more surprisingly, physical infrastructure 
also shapes the institutional and social organisation of a society, 
through a historical process of change and evolution described 
as “co-evolution” (Foxon, 2011). This implies that changing 
infrastructure operation necessarily involves larger social and 
institutional shifts as well as technical improvements that are 
currently considered when scenarios of future infrastructure 
are described.
The present form of infrastructure operation can be de-
scribed as separate utility supply systems provisioning uncon-
strained demand, with higher throughput volumes correspond-
ing to larger economic revenue. There is often little incentive 
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for end-user savings, for example in the UK, the majority of 
water and waste services are unmetered. This is risky and ul-
timately unsustainable because unlimited growth in demand 
means unlimited pressures on ecosystems and natural resourc-
es; at a time when we are already well beyond our planetary safe 
operating space Rockstrom et al., 2009). From the perspective 
of societal resilience and security of supply, a system which un-
derstands and manages demand is much more secure than one 
of unlimited dependence on external, most often imported and 
sometimes scarce, inputs (Foresight, 2011). 
Technically, a large demand for resources is often a symp-
tom of systemic inefficiencies, since modern technologies in 
almost every domain enable the same standard of service de-
livery at drastically lowered consumption levels (Cullen et al., 
2011). For example more than 60 % of UK domestic energy 
costs result from space heating (DECC 2012a) yet if a build-
ing is perfectly sealed and insulated, a constant temperature 
can be maintained without the addition of heat. Since the 
1970s, spurred by the oil crisis, research on energy use has 
demonstrated huge potential for efficient “win-win” techno-
logical improvements or behaviour changes that would result 
in joint resource and cost saving (Lovins 1985). This type of 
joint economic and technology analysis is now commonplace 
when considering carbon mitigation options (abatement cost 
curves, or MAC curves)(McKinsey, 2010), and has been ap-
plied to water (2030 Water Resources Group, 2009) and other 
resource streams measures such as waste reduction (Beau-
mont and Tinch, 2004). 
When such studies are conducted, what is surprising is not 
just the existence of many diverse win-win, or “no regrets,” re-
source efficient technologies or behaviours, but the magnitude 
of the macro-economic costs that their adoption would save. 
In addition, there is a great deal of potential for resource ef-
ficiency improvements at the end-user side, which is currently 
under exploited. This in turn begs the question: if such cost-
saving technologies and resource efficiencies exist, why are they 
not implemented as part of the business-as-usual incentives of 
market economies? Even if existing actors don’t immediately 
grasp the benefits of new technologies or behaviours, surely 
new successful enterprises could be established on the basis 
of these large cost savings. However, no matter the resource 
stream, application or bundle of resource efficiency measures 
under consideration, the adoption of many win-win solutions 
always lags far behind their estimated potential (Cullen et al., 
2011). A new approach is needed to accelerate adoption of re-
source efficient technologies and behaviours.
In the last decade, researchers from the fields of Industrial 
Ecology and Sustainable Consumption & Production have put 
forward proposals aiming to circumvent or resolve many of the 
barriers to efficiency described above, gathered under the title 
of “performance economy” or “functional economy” (Mont 
and Tukker, 2006; Stahel, 2010; Steinberger et al., 2009). These 
ideas require a fundamental shift: away from selling products 
or metered quantities of utility, and towards selling “services”: 
which can be defined as the ultimate goal of the product or util-
ity purchase. When applied to infrastructure this would mean 
that the utility company (selling units of utility such as electric-
ity, gas or water) is replaced by a utility service company (which 
sells the ultimate service provided by the infrastructure, such as 
thermal comfort, illumination or motive power).
Utility service companies have only been studied in the en-
ergy sector (Energy Service Companies (ESCo)). Several stud-
ies have investigated the international status (Vine, 2005) and 
the future potential of ESCos (Hannon et al., in press; Westling, 
2003), as well as the European situation, diversity of contract 
types and economics of service companies (Bertoldi et al., 2006; 
Marino et al., 2010; Sorrell, 2007). All of the studies agree on 
the beneficial nature of ESCo operation for the implementation 
of energy and cost-efficient technologies (including the reduc-
tion of initial investment costs and transfer of risk). However, 
they also agree on the huge obstacles to mainstreaming the 
ESCo business model, from regulation to lack of information 
and training to risk sharing. Left to the market, the adoption of 
these business models has lagged behind expectations, how-
ever, there is little work investigating how governance could 
help to overcome these obstacles or support the transfer of the 
energy service model to other infrastructures.
In parallel to this, there is increased interest in the risks and 
opportunities presented by the increasing interconnectivity 
and interdependence of our infrastructure systems. This in-
terconnectivity occurs at the physical, operational and digital 
level (CST, 2009a; Hall et al, 2012; Rinaldi et al., 2001). Physical 
interdependence is well illustrated in the water and energy sys-
tems: water and wastewater treatment plants place a significant 
burden on the energy system, and are becoming more energy 
intensive as water quality standards become increasingly strin-
gent (CST, 2009a). Conversely, there is a great deal of potential 
to generate energy within water and wastewater facilities (for, 
example through anaerobic digestion of sewage sludge and the 
use of hydro turbines) and support the energy system. Inter-
connectivity is also important at the end-user level – for exam-
ple the use of hot water, which accounts for 5.5 per cent of UK 
household energy use (Defra, 2008). A reduction in hot water 
use would not only contribute to reductions in water consump-
tion but also to a reduction in energy consumption. The UK 
government commissioned research to investigate the contri-
bution of UK infrastructure interdependencies to economic 
growth (Frontier Economics, 2012) and the Infrastructure 
Transition Research Consortium will develop new methods 
for analysing performance, risks and interdependencies of UK 
infrastructure (Hall et al., 2012). While most of this work is 
focussed on analysing challenges and opportunities of physical 
infrastructure interconnections within the supply system, little 
emphasis has been placed on integration of infrastructure at the 
end user or on integration in operation and governance.
The work presented in this paper has been conducted as part 
of the EPSRC funded project, Land of the Multi-Utility Service 
Companies (Land of the MUSCos). Land of the MUSCos in-
vestigates how we might accelerate the adoption of alternative 
infrastructure operation configurations which are: centred on 
the end-user and their demand for services; concerned with 
implementing resource efficiency improvements; and take into 
account multiple utility streams simultaneously. The project 
considers MUSCo adoption in the UK but many of the finding 
will be relevant in the EU and beyond.
This paper focuses in particular on the role that the recent 
Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) plays in the transition to 
widespread adoption of MUSCos. The EED has been selected 
for analysis because energy is required to deliver the majority of 
household infrastructure services and as a result energy policy 
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will have influence over the infrastructure systems required to 
deliver these services. We begin by describing in more detail 
why service and performance contracts and more integration 
of operation would lead to more resource efficient and resil-
ient infrastructure. We then describe key barriers, identified 
through a literature review, to a more service and performance-
oriented, integrated mode of operation. The role of energy ef-
ficiency governance in overcoming these barriers and acceler-
ating transition to MUSCos is then addressed and exemplified 
with the EU’s Energy Efficiency Directive. We present a review 
of the extent to which the EED could overcome the barriers 
identified in the literature review. We conclude with a discus-
sion of the priority areas for future policy.
Multi-Utility	Service	Companies
The overarching purpose of seeking to accelerate the adoption 
of MUSCos is the potential step-change in resource efficiency 
that could be delivered; the MUSCo itself is a means to an end. 
We define a MUSCo as a means of operating infrastructure 
which displays the characteristics of service and performance-
orientation and integrated “multi” utility delivery with the 
overarching aim to reduce resource consumption. However, we 
do not suggest this is the only solution to the efficiency gap de-
scribed above, but that it is one of a suite of measures required 
to deliver a more resource efficient and resilient infrastructure 
system. We define and describe the two core characteristics of 
a MUSCo in more detail below.
SERVICE	&	PERFORMANCE-ORIENTED	INFRASTRUCTURE
The notion of service and performance-orientation of infra-
structure operation builds on the concept of the performance 
economy or functional economy, which has been applied in 
detail to the servitization of products (Stahel, 2010). At the 
product level, the term “Product Service System” is often used 
to describe new commercial arrangements where a service is 
sold rather than a product (Mont and Tukker, 2006) . A typi-
cal example would be a car-sharing service, as opposed to 
traditional car ownership. Beyond the raw materials saved by 
sharing one car between several users, the high level of main-
tenance and variety of models lead to higher efficiency at each 
use. Famous examples of companies providing product service 
systems are Xerox copy machines, Michelin truck tires, Hilti 
construction tools and Rolls Royce turbines. Generally, product 
service systems are based on leasing arrangements, where the 
user defines the level and type of service they will require, and 
the seller then proposes technically appropriate solutions. By 
allowing freedom from traditional ownership models, the life-
time of consumer products can be extended, the leased prod-
ucts taken back for remanufacturing at the most optimal time, 
and higher levels of efficiency along the supply and use chain 
can be achieved (Stahel, 2010.
At the infrastructure level, an established example of per-
formance contracting is ESCos, which serve their customers 
by guaranteeing durably lower energy bills whilst maintaining 
the services provided by energy supplied (Sorrell, 2007). ESCos 
can take many forms (public, private, part of traditional util-
ity companies, or completely separate), but by definition their 
profits must be made mostly through the energy savings of 
their customers. ESCos thus have an incentive structure oppo-
site to that of traditional energy supply companies: they benefit 
from the lowered energy use of their clients, rather than from 
their increased consumption (see Figure 1 for a schematic com-
parison). The ESCo business model thus relies on more than a 
simple meter for electricity or gas: the basis of the energy con-
tract is no longer the volume of consumption, but a guaranteed 
provision of energy service provided at a lower level of energy 
consumption. This performance-based relationship could be 
applied to other infrastructure services, which often rely on 
more than one infrastructure system (for example cleanliness 
depend on energy and water) requiring a more integrated ap-
proach to operation.
INTEGRATED	INFRASTRUCTURE	OPERATION
Infrastructure is becoming more integrated physically (for ex-
ample, the relationships between energy and water described 
above), operationally (for example, infrastructure is owned by 
one party but under the oversight of other organisations) and 
digitally (for example, the reliance of managed motorways on 
ICT to manage traffic flows). This leads to risks as one system 
becomes more vulnerable to cascading failures from other sys-
tems (Rinaldi et al., 2001; Zimmerman and Restrepo, 2006). 
Importantly, operating infrastructure systems in silos leads to 
“financial and operational inefficiencies, a poorer service to cit-
 
 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of traditional vs performance-based incentive structure (Steinberger et al., 2009).
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izens and businesses, and unintended negative consequences” 
(CST, 2009b). 
This inefficiency becomes particularly apparent when one 
considers infrastructure services at the end user; one service 
may rely on many infrastructure systems. Optimisation be-
comes extremely challenging when these systems are operated 
individually. Table  1 provides an illustration of the interde-
pendence of infrastructure systems at the end-user level (i.e. 
individual households and industry) from a service perspec-
tive. The table does not include interconnectivity upstream of 
the end-user, for example the energy required to produce cold 
water. At a glance five different service types could be separated 
regarding the infrastructure streams affected. Ambient tem-
perature, illumination and industrial process heat and motive 
power is solely provided through the energy infrastructure, and 
irrigation and industrial process water only affect the water sec-
tor. In between the two hygiene and food and drink preparation 
requires a combination of energy and water infrastructures. 
Entertainment and communication requires energy besides the 
communication infrastructure. Mobility is provided through 
the transport and energy infrastructure and additionally might 
include communication when virtual access modes are consid-
ered. This highlights the importance of energy policy for infra-
structure operation since energy infrastructure is involved in 
almost all service provision at the end-user level. Furthermore 
communication might enhance efficiency gains in other infra-
structure stream and therefore serve as an enabling technology. 
The individual operation of infrastructure systems is cur-
rently amplified by fractured governance1 systems, which have 
not evolved uniformly across utility streams and rarely take 
interconnectedness into account (Hall et al., 2012). The gov-
1.We define governance as �the use of institutions, structures of authority and even 
collaboration to allocate resources and coordinate or control activity in society or 
the economy.” (Bell, 2002). It is not limited to the actions of national governments 
but includes the policy developed and implemented by a complex network of non-
state actors at international and sub-national levels (Smith, Stirling, & Berkhout, 
2005).
ernance arrangements have evolved in response to the changes 
within of the individual utility systems and thus exhibit dra-
matic differences between sectors. Governance continues to be 
implemented in sector-specific silos – synergies and interde-
pendencies are largely ignored and opportunities for cost and 
resource savings are missed. For example, schemes designed to 
reduce end-use of energy, such as building regulations; for ex-
ample the Green Deal (DECC 2012b) and the Energy Company 
Obligation (ECO) (UK Parliament, 2012) don’t address the end 
use of water. This could actively deter MUSCo proliferation by 
incentivising action in one infrastructure system and preclud-
ing more integrated approaches to efficiency.
Barriers	to	MUSCos
There are no MUSCos according to our definition in operation 
in Europe; therefore, there is no empirical evidence relating to 
the principal barriers to their adoption. Instead, in this section 
we investigate the barriers to the two characteristics of MUSCos; 
service and performance orientation and integrated delivery.
SERVICE	AND	PERFORMANCE-ORIENTED	INFRASTRUCTURE
A review of literature related to infrastructure services has been 
undertaken to identify the principal barriers to adoption of 
service and performance-oriented operation. This is predomi-
nantly drawn from the Energy Service literature, owing to the 
lack of literature on other infrastructure services. The barriers 
identified are summarised in Table 22.
The review identified a number of factors that increased the 
risk to investors (high investment costs, high transaction costs, 
2. International accounting rules� In the case of an operating lease the annual 
contracting fee needs to be booked as revenue while the unbilled receivables are 
reduced. This operation in the balance sheet can have a negative impact on the 
credit rating. In the case of a financial lease, the total revenue needs to be booked 
at the end of the project and therefore annual booking is not allowed. In this case, 
the ESCO needs to finance the VAT for the whole duration of the project (Marino, 
Bertoldi and Resezzy, 2010).
Table	1.	Overview	of	services	provided,	related	technology	categories	involved	and	infrastructure	interdependencies.
Service Technology categories involved Infrastructure affected 
  Energy Water Transp. Com. 
Ambient temperature /thermal 
comfort 
Insulation, heating, cooling, ventilation ü   (ü) 
Illumination Day illumination, artificial lighting,  ü   (ü) 
Industrial process heat and 
motive power 
Heat and physical process appliances ü    
Hygiene, food & drink 
preparation (sustenance), hot 
industrial process water 
Water, cleaning, and kitchen appliances ü ü  (ü) 
Irrigation, cold industrial 
process water 
Water appliances  ü   
Entertainment & 
communication 
 
Entertainment and communication appliances ü   ü 
Mobility (i.e. personal access 
to work, education, shopping, 
and daily leisure, carriage of 
freight) 
Different modes of transport:  
road (cars, lorries, buses, motorcycles),  
rail, ship, and human-powered transport; 
and virtual access modes:  
tele-working, online education & shopping 
ü  ü (ü) 
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lack of ability to secure long-term contracts, scale of project, 
and uncertainty over government incentives); increased risk to 
end-users (contractual flexibility, verification of savings, poor 
awareness and knowledge) and structural barriers (revenue 
generation, competition regulation).
INTEGRATED	INFRASTRUCTURE	OPERATION
A separate review of literature related to infrastructure integra-
tion was undertaken to identify the principal barriers to inte-
grated infrastructure operation. This is predominantly related 
to integration upstream of the end-user, owing to the lack of 
literature addressing integration at the end-user. The barriers 
identified are summarised in Table 3.
The review identified that a lack of evidence of risks and op-
portunities was contributing to segregation of infrastructure 
systems and compounding ineffective regulation, decision 
making and costing of the effects of infrastructure intercon-
nectivity.
The	contribution	of	the	Energy	Efficiency	Directive	to	
overcoming	barriers	to	MUSCos
Infrastructure provides a public good; therefore, the services it 
delivers need to be reliable, at a sufficient level of quality and 
quantity, and offer value for money. Governance, usually in the 
form of regulation and policy intervention, is needed to cor-
rect the market and system failures that would arise in a purely 
privatised utility system, many of which contribute to the bar-
riers identified above. For example, the market does not deliver 
the required investment into infrastructure development as a 
Table	2.	Principal	barriers	to	service	oriented	infrastructure	operation	(based	on	Hall	et	al.,	2012;	Marino	et	al.,	2010;	Sorrell,	2007	and	Hannon	et	al.,	in	press).
Table	3.	Principal	barriers	to	integrated	infrastructure	operation	(based	on	CST,	2009a;	Frontier	Economics,	2012;	Hall	et	al.,	2012).
Barrier Notes 
Accounting International accounting rules (IFRS) can have a negative effect on credit rating or VAT 
financing. 
Profits delivered over the medium to long-term. 
Financing Access to financing – lending is asset based and banks are cautious about cash-flow based 
lending. Disconnect between guaranteed savings and access to finance. Availability and 
appropriate forms. 
Potentially high initial investment costs so proposition appears high risk. 
Procurement  Excessive tendering requirements puts off smaller companies (many ESCos are small). 
Public bodies failing to account for lifetime costs. 
Principal agent problem – landlords own property but would not benefit from savings. 
Contracts Lack of flexibility. Length of commitment. Lack of standardisation – time consuming to 
develop. Complex contracts.  
Require collaboration. 
Unstable consumers and demand driven by external factors. 
Monitoring and verification Unavailability of energy consumption data to produce baselines. Complex 
definition/specification and verification of service delivered. 
Awareness and trust Few examples outside industry and public sector. Poor levels of awareness and knowledge 
of service-oriented offers. Mistrust of consumers and little experience of service contracts. 
Scale Risks dispersed and difficult to manage. Inappropriate scale for financing. Reverse 
economies of scale – out competed by incumbents. 
Governance Perverse incentives, such as cross-subsidised energy prices. Lack of specific regulatory 
framework or accreditation schemes for service contracts. Poor future regulatory stability. 
Regulation to improve competition in monopoly sectors prevents appropriate length of 
contracts. Regulation prevents generation of revenue from sources other than utility 
throughput (for example UK Water Industry). 
 
Barrier Notes 
Governance Inappropriate incentives. Regulation in silos prevents cross-utility operation, accounting and 
investment. Strategic planning in national policy is fragmented. 
Decision making processes Decision making processes are locked into consideration of separate infrastructure operation 
by business practices, planning process and regulation. Poor information sharing. 
Co-ordination Information asymmetries can lead to market failures when one party has more information 
about the nature of an activity or risk than another party. Integration between systems 
requires co-ordination over time and scale, which implies significant changes in business 
planning and operation. 
Cost externalities One infrastructure system may affect another without any need for the cost and benefits of 
that impact to be taken into account. 
Evidence There is limited quantification of the risks and benefits of infrastructure integration, which 
makes action difficult. 
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result of scale of investment required and the long pay-back 
periods and most often indirect benefit to private entities (Hall 
et al., 2012). Non-traditional technologies and business models 
(for example ESCOs) are often under-represented as a result of 
market imperfections, such as information asymmetries and 
monopolistic competition (Hall et al., 2012). Governance is re-
quired to encourage investment and innovation that would not 
be delivered by the market alone, therefore it has a key role in 
accelerating the adoption of MUSCos. 
There has been a plethora of recent directives and strategies 
relating to resource efficiency, which, in effect, seek to achieve 
the same aim as MUSCos; to reduce absolute resource con-
sumption, without reducing the service delivered (for exam-
ple, the EU 20-20-20 targets, Roadmap to a Resource Efficient 
Europe (European Commission 2011), the Energy Efficiency 
Directive (European Commission 2012)). These policy instru-
ments have the potential to affect the barriers described above 
both positively and negatively. Energy policy, in particular, has 
significant potential to affect the adoption of MUSCos as a re-
sult of its promotion of infrastructure services (ESCo) and the 
fact that energy is involved in the majority of infrastructure 
services. As a result, we have undertaken a detailed review of 
the EU’s Energy Efficiency Directive (EED) (European Com-
mission, 2012) to identify the extent to which it addresses and 
is likely to overcome the barriers identified above. We present 
our findings in the sections below for the two characteristics 
of MUSCos.
SERVICE	AND	PERFORMANCE-ORIENTATION
The EED has made provision for significant advancements on 
the promotion of service oriented infrastructure operation. It 
specifically addresses measures to increase the adoption of ‘en-
ergy performance contracting3’ and the contribution of ‘energy 
service providers4’ to energy efficiency. The measures defined 
to encourage adoption of energy service provision and energy 
performance contracting have been evaluated to determine the 
extent to which they could overcome barriers to wider infra-
structure service-oriented contracts.
Accounting: The Directive makes explicit reference to remov-
ing accounting barriers to service companies (paragraph 48 of 
introduction) and Member States will be required to report on 
progress towards removing regulatory barriers in their Nation-
al Energy Efficiency Action Plans. It goes on to state in Arti-
cle 15 (8) that “Member states shall ensure that national energy 
regulatory authorities encourage demand side resources, such 
as demand response, to participate alongside supply in whole-
sale and retail markets”, which implies that barriers to genera-
tion of revenue from alternative sources should be removed if 
this article is implemented effectively. It is not clear to what 
3.Defined in the EED as �a contractual arrangement between the beneficiary and 
the provider of an energy efficiency improvement measure, verified and monitored 
during the whole term of the contract, where investments (work, supply or service) 
in that measure are paid for in relation to a contractually agreed energy perform-
ance criterion, such as financial savings”.
4.Defined in the EED as �a natural or legal person who deliver energy services 
[the physical benefit, utility or good derived from a combination of energy with 
energy-efficient technology or with action, which may include the operations, 
maintenance and control necessary to deliver the service, which is delivered on 
the basis of a contract and in normal circumstances has proven to result in verifi-
able and measurable or estimable energy efficiency improvements] or any other 
energy efficiency measure in the final customer’s facility or premises”.
extent this will help to overcome international accounting rules 
that affect credit ratings. 
Financing: Loan guarantees to foster energy performance 
contracting are specifically mentioned in paragraph 52 of the 
introduction as a means to overcoming barriers to the avail-
ability of financing. Article 12 requires Member States to take 
appropriate measures to promote and facilitate efficient use of 
energy generally, which include fiscal incentives and access to 
finance, grants or subsidies. More specifically, Article 18 re-
quires Member States to promote the energy services market 
disseminating information on financial instruments, incentives, 
grants and loans to support energy efficiency projects. There 
is no requirement to support appropriate forms of financing 
specifically for service contract.
Procurement: Article 6 (3) Encourages public bodies to “as-
sess the possibility of concluding long-term energy perform-
ance contracts that provide long term energy savings”. It does 
not provide any provision for changing procurement processes 
to assess lifetime costs or address procurement in landlord-
tenant arrangements.
Contracts: A major advancement of the EED is its promo-
tion of model contracts; paragraph  47 of the introduction 
recognises the vital role they will play in stimulating demand 
for and the supply of energy services. Article 18 reiterates this 
point requiring Member States to provide model contracts for 
the public sector, including a specific Annex (XIII) outlining 
the minimum items to be included in energy performance 
contracts with the public sector. However, this requirement 
does not extend beyond the public sector to the domestic sec-
tor, which is where transaction costs are higher still (Sorrell, 
2007).
Monitoring and verification: Article 8 of the EED requires 
Member States to promote the availability of energy audits 
and specifically states that the findings of these audits must be 
available to energy service providers. This could improve the 
baseline data making initial requirement description more 
straightforward. However, there is no reference to measures 
that might improve the quantification and verification of sav-
ings.
Awareness and trust: The EED recognises the importance 
of transparency in developing the market for energy services. 
Article  12 specifically addresses consumer information and 
empowering, requiring Member States to “take appropriate 
measures to promote and facilitate an efficient use of energy”. 
And in relation to energy services requires them to disseminate 
information on the energy service contracts, financial instru-
ments, incentives, grants and loans specifically relevant to “en-
ergy efficiency service projects”. It also requires Member States 
to make publicly available lists of available energy service pro-
viders. This could go some way towards increasing awareness 
in and trust of service contracts.
Scale: There is only one statement relating to the barrier as-
sociated with the challenge of appropriate scale of contracts 
and finance; in paragraph 52 of the introduction stating that 
financing facilities could be “linked to programmes of agencies 
which will aggregate and assess the quality of energy saving 
projects, provide technical assistance, promote the energy serv-
ices market and the to generate consumer demand for energy 
services”. There are no specific clauses or requirements to enact 
this aggregation function.
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Governance: The EED recognises the need for an integrated 
approach to energy efficiency (in paragraph 45) and the need 
to “identify and remove regulatory … barriers to the use of 
energy performance contracting …”. There are some specific 
issues identified; in Article 7 (7) allows obligated parties to 
count savings from energy service contracts to count towards 
Energy Efficiency Obligation schemes; Member States are re-
quired to ensure national energy regulatory authorities en-
courage demand response; Article 19 requires Member States 
to “evaluate and if necessary take appropriate measures to 
remove regulatory and non-regulatory barriers to energy ef-
ficiency”.
In summary, the EED specifically addresses participation 
of demand-side management in the wholesale electricity mar-
ket, fiscal incentives to reduce the risk of investment in energy 
efficiency technologies, model contracts in the public sector, 
energy audits to improve monitoring of baseline conditions, 
dissemination of examples and providers or energy services 
and removal of regulatory barriers to energy performance con-
tracting. However, it does not address international accounting 
rules, financing specific to energy services, lifetime cost assess-
ment of energy contracts, verification of savings or aggregation 
of small contracts or model contracts for domestic or commer-
cial users to reduce transaction costs.
INTEGRATED	INFRASTRUCTURE	OPERATION
The EED is, of course, focussed on the energy system and ef-
ficiency improvements therein. However, measures contained 
within the EED have been assessed to identify the potential 
to overcome or augment the disconnection in infrastructure 
operation and regulation by prioritising energy over other in-
frastructure systems. 
Governance: The EED does consider infrastructure integra-
tion, to some extent, through its promotion of cogeneration of 
electricity, heat and hot water. There are two articles (14 and 
15), which aim to encourage new high efficiency cogeneration 
and reduce the regulatory barriers associated with connection 
to the grid. Article 9 (3) also provides a mechanism for allo-
cating costs for heat and hot water produced by cogeneration, 
which could provide a demonstrator that could lead the way 
to overcome the barriers of price regulation and cross-sector 
accounting. However, the Directive places a great deal of em-
phasis on providing and marketing incentives, loans and grants 
specifically for energy efficiency, which could distract from a 
more integrated approach to resource efficiency.
Decision making processes: are addressed to some extent in 
the EED by Article 6 (1), which states that central government 
should “purchase only products, services and buildings with 
high energy-efficiency performance, insofar that it is consistent 
with … wider sustainability …”. And that energy audits might 
be undertaken as part of a broader environmental audit. How-
ever retrofitting targets set out in Article 5 are specifically for 
energy performance, which misses the opportunity to under-
take a wider energy efficiency-driven retrofit and could drive 
retrofit decisions to focus on individual infrastructure systems.
Co-ordination: is encouraged to some extent in the directive, 
by Article 6 on procurement, Article 8 on energy audits and 
Articles 14 and 15 on cogeneration. However, there are some 
significant opportunities for co-ordination missed, in particu-
lar, the targets for retrofitting, as discussed above.
There are no articles or requirements that would specifically 
improve the evidence base relating to the risks and benefits of 
infrastructure integration or address the challenge of unac-
counted cost externalities.
In summary, the EED could help overcome barriers to in-
tegration by encouraging the cogeneration of electricity, heat 
and hot water and encouraging consideration of wider sus-
tainability in energy audits and energy service procurement. 
However, it could amplify barriers by focussing on energy 
incentives, audits and marketing and setting retrofitting tar-
gets for energy alone, which could detracting from efficiency 
across systems. 
Discussion
Despite its focus on the energy system, the EED goes a long 
way towards encouraging service-oriented infrastructure op-
eration and has the potential to prepare the way for service-
based contracts in other infrastructure systems. The EED pro-
vides some of the strongest instruments for energy efficiency to 
date, including a series of quantitative target, energy-efficient 
retrofitting and provision of financing and grants for energy ef-
ficiency. It also specifically addresses service contracts through 
measures to raise awareness of service contracts and service 
providers. Its requirement to provide model contracts could 
drastically reduce transaction costs associated with contract 
establishment in the public sector.
However, some crucial barriers will not be addressed if it is 
transposed into national policy in its current form. This is par-
ticularly the case for barriers associated with financing and ac-
counting; including international accounting rules, accounting 
by lenders, development and provision of appropriate forms of 
finance, and profit timescales. 
The EED does little to reduce the risks and transaction costs 
associated with domestic and commercial service and perform-
ance-oriented contracts. Some of the instruments with most 
potential to address contractual barriers, such as long-term 
contracts and model contracts, are only applied to the public 
sector. This omits the huge opportunities for efficiency saving 
in the domestic and commercial sectors where there are per-
haps more significant barriers to MUSCo adoption (Sorrell, 
2007). This is compounded by the fact that there are no specific 
instruments that would improve the definition and specifica-
tion of energy services for verification and no instruments de-
signed to improve aggregation or ‘bundling’ of contracts with 
smaller end-users.
There are few provisions to exploit opportunities for effi-
ciency from a more integrated approach to infrastructure op-
eration. Some of the strongest measures in the Directive (the 
quantitative targets for reductions in energy consumption and 
energy-specific retrofitting on central government property) 
have the potential to discourage integration in infrastructure 
operation by putting too much focus on one sector.
In addition, there is no proposal to remove the barrier cre-
ated by regulation, intended to increase competition in util-
ity supply, which prevents utility providers from committing 
customers to long contract. This is also the case for the tar-
get for retrofitting, which only applied to central government. 
This excludes opportunities in local government and domestic 
buildings.
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Some outstanding issues that would help strengthen the role 
of the EED in accelerating the adoption of MUSCos include:
• Removing regulation to prevent long term contracts in the 
domestic sector;
• Introducing standard or model contracts in the domestic 
and commercial sectors;
• Developing financing arrangements which are appropriate 
to service contracts and reduce high initial investment re-
quirements;
• Provide detailed support on the definition and specifica-
tion of services to support development and verification of 
contracts;
• Encourage the development of coherent and integrated 
strategies across infrastructure systems;
• Provide guidance and incentives for aggregation of small-
scale contracts to reduce transaction costs in the domestic 
and commercial sectors;
• Explicitly recognise the interconnectivity of infrastructure 
during the development of future Directives.
Conclusions
MUSCos have the potential to contribute to improvements in 
the resource efficiency of infrastructure systems and to over-
come the efficiency gap observed in current resource efficiency 
policy. However, there are numerous barriers to the realisation 
of service-oriented, integrated infrastructure operation. The 
widespread adoption of MUSCos is unlikely to come about if 
left entirely to the market; governance must intervene to over-
come the market barriers and remove obstructive policy and 
regulation.
In this paper we have investigated the extent to which the 
Energy Efficiency Directive could begin to reduce barriers to 
MUSCo adoption. The review found that the EED could be 
very effective at increasing adoption of service-oriented con-
tracts in the public sector through measures legislating build-
ing retrofit and reducing contractual barriers. This could in-
crease the energy service sector’s capacity to deliver service 
contracts and reduce mistrust of service contracts, potentially 
resulting in spillover of service contracts to the domestic and 
commercial sector. However, without changes to accounting 
practices and appropriate financing arrangements investment 
risks would remain high. In combination with a lack of meas-
ures to reduce the risk and costs of administering small-scale 
contracts it is unlikely that this spillover would occur in reality.
In addition, the continued fragmentation of European and 
National strategy and cross-sector information asymmetries5 
augments the existing governance barriers to more integrated 
operation of infrastructure which prevents the exploitation of 
cross-sector efficiency opportunities. 
5. For example it is disproportionately harder to justify investment in low carbon 
technology to the end user in the water sector than in the energy sector. Users of 
water are generally unaware of the benefits of low carbon technologies in relation 
to supply of clean water. This can prevent investment in these technologies and 
constrain opportunities to generate energy on water company property. 
We have described a series of additional measures we consid-
er to be necessary to overcome these weaknesses. These include 
measures to reduce contractual barriers and risks in the domes-
tic sector, provide more appropriate financing and accounting 
arrangements and more explicitly address the interconnectivity 
of infrastructure systems in future policy.
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